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1. Introduction 
Bradley W. Bateman and John B. Davis 
It is not clear what draws so many scholars to the work of 1.M. Keynes. 
There are certainly several possibilities: his central role in the development 
of modern macroeconomics; the widespread belief that he 'saved capi-
talism' with his advocacy of deficit spending during the Great Depres-
sion; his part at the Versailles Peace Conference and fame as the author 
of The Economic Consequences of the Peace; his activity at Bretton Woods 
in the founding of the post-war monetary system; his involvement in the 
avant-garde Bloomsbury group. But, whatever the reasons, there seelTl8 
to be no decline in interest in Keynes 's lifetime of work, as each year the 
number of essays and books published on Keynes continues to increase. 
Indeed, in the 1980s, interest in Keynes's work began to spread beyond 
the writings and discuss' ,~ns of economists, as historians (Clarke, 
Skidelsky, Peden) and political scientists (Hall, Skocpol, Hadley, 
Gourevitch) added their contributions to the growing literature on Keynes. 
Another new area of interest has been the philosophical dimensions of 
Keynes's early thinking and its relationship to his later work in economics. 
Ironically, although most standard treatments of the history ofprobabiJity 
theory include a discussion of Keynes's Treatise on Probability, until 
recently the existence of the Treatise and Keynes's early career as a 
philosopher have gone largely unnoticed by economists. Indeed, for 
many years it had been standard practice to explain The General Theory 
as the end-product of an evolution that began with A Tract on Monetary 
Reform and A Treatise on Money , while ignoring Keynes's earlier intel-
lectual development in his first years at Cambridge; this despite the fact 
that it is in the Treatise on Probability that Keynes first develops ideas 
which were arguably laterto underlie his thinking about expectations and 
uncertainty - an area of considerable importance in The General Theory . 
It is fair to say that much of the new interest in Keynes's early thinking 
can be traced to a widespread preoccupation with expectations in modern 
macroeconomics in the 1970s and 1980s, and the recent recognition that 
Keynes's own thinking about expectations dated from his early philo-
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sophical investigation of probability and induction in the Treatise on 
Probability. Thus, although Keynesian economic theory was, for a time, 
popularly considered obsolete on account of its supposed neglect of 
expectations, economists have increasingly come to recognize that 
Keynes 's thinking in this regard was both extensive and well motivated 
by carefully considered philosophical positions in probability theory. 
This has drawn attention to the entire trajectory of Keynes ' s intel1ectual 
career and has demonstrated to many the central role of philosophical 
assumptions in economics. 
It is important to note, however, that the Treatise on Probability does 
not mark the beginning of Keynes's work in philosophy; it is the 
culmination of over 15 years' work. Initial convictions for thinkers of 
great insight and synthetic understanding are often important to their 
later intel1ectual development, and Keynes himself testified in his 1938 
'My Early Beliefs' memoir to the importance of the earliest Cambridge 
influences on the development of his later thinking. These influences 
concerned, of course, the considerable impression which the wel1-known 
Cambridge philosopherG.E. Moore 's Principia Ethica had upon Keynes 
and other members of the Cambridge Conversazione Society, or Apos-
tles. Keynes in fact wrote a number of yet unpublished philsophical 
papers on topics in Moore's Principia, a number of which (in particular, 
his 1904 ' Ethics in Relation to Conduct ' ) have recently been argued by 
scholars to have contributed to Keynes's first ideas for his Treatise on 
Probability, as well as to his later economic thinking. The interest in 
Keynes as a philosopher, then, is still quite fresh, and attention to 
Keynes ' s early intellectual career promises to form an important part of 
future scholarship on Keynes. 
The essays in this collection represent an introduction to the work of 
a number of the people currently concerned with the philosophical 
foundations of Keynes ' s thought. Each of the essays is an original 
contribution that reflects the author's perspective on interpreting Keynes's 
philosophy. 
The first essay, by Yuichi Shionoya, examines the relationship between 
Keynes's much-quoted 'My Early Beliefs' memoir and his philosophical 
beginnings at Cambridge in Moore's circle. Shionoya argues that Keynes 
adopted Moore's meta-ethical intuitionism and agreed that hedonism 
was an inadequate conception of the good, whilst rejecting Moore's 
consequentialist teleology and emphasis on rules in determining right 
behaviour. This interpretation of Keynes 's early positions is distinguished 
from that associated with R.B . Braithwaite 's influential reading of 
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Keynes's philosophical views and thus serves an important function in 
setting forth the issues first addressed by those concerned to connect the 
different stages of Keynes's intellectual career. Shionoya also discusses 
the relationship between Keynes's ethics and politics. 
Indeed, some of the most vexing questio'ls about Keynes's thinking 
concern his political philosophy. What spirit and ideology infonned his 
lifelong professional interest in economic management? Suzanne Helburn 
finds the answer in Keynes's early interest in the work and life of Edmund 
Burke. Because Burke is noted for his conservative thought, this asso-
ciation may seem paradoxical at first, but Helbum's careful exegesis is 
successful in illuminating the similarities and differences between the 
two thinkers. She argues that the dimensions of Keynes's utilitarian 
analysis, ethics and elitism all stem from his understanding of this 
eighteenth-century political philosopher. 
Bradley Bateman's essay on the analytical foundations of Keynes's 
policy proposals is an attempt to break with much of the emerging 
literature on Keynes's philosophical background. Unlike those who 
argue that Keynes developed one philosophical position in his youth 
which infonns all his later thinking, Bateman uses Keynes's statements 
during the 1930s that his beliefs had changed to tell a much different 
story . On this telling, it was Keynes's shift from a belief in objective 
value and objective probabilities to a belief in subjective value and 
subjective probabilities that provided him with the tools necessary for 
modelling expectations and making satisfactory policy recommendations. 
Understanding this perspective also involves a break with the naive view 
that The General Theory is a book meant to advocate fiscal fine-tuning. 
Rod O' Donnell 's essay on the weight of argument in Keynes's 
theoretical work is an effort to clarify some of the confusion surrounding 
an often misunderstood idea. O'Donnell traces the origins of the concept 
of weight in Keynes ' s early work, and discusses its role in the Treatise 
on Probability and The General Theory. He argues that weight is not 
identical to evidence but, rather, that it represents the credence which a 
given amount of evidence provides for a probability; although credence 
always increases with the amount of evidence, the two notions are not 
identical. 0 ' Donnell concludes by arguing that Keynes's lifelong interest 
in the improved collection and dissemination of economic data was 
partly motivated by his concern with weight. 
In his essay, John Davis turns to Keynes 's 1938 characterization of 
economics as a moral science and investigates how this view was rooted 
in Keynes's early philosophical convictions. Davis argues that Keynes 
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stressed the importance of introspection and judgements of value for 
understanding economic agents' responses to the uncertainties of action, 
and did so with the intention of contrasting his view of economics to that 
of Lionel Robbins. For Keynes, introspection and judgements of value 
are made possible by individuals' capacity for both individual judgement 
and for judging what is intersubjectively objective. Robbins's rejection 
of interpersonal utility comparisons stemmed from a failure to recognize 
that latter dimension to human judgement; Keynes's attention to this 
dimension, it is suggested, underlies his v iew of the independent variables 
of The General Theory. 
In her essay, Anna Carabelli also turns to Keynes's methodological 
thinking by examining the underlying principles of Keynes's critique of 
what he termed 'classical theory'. She argues that Keynes recognized the 
ineffectiveness of past critiques of orthodox theory, and that a successful 
critique demanded new epistemolegical thinking. Indeed, the fault of 
classical theory lay neither in its empirical unacceptability nor in logical 
inconsistency but rather in certain of its tacit assumptions concerning 
'logical independence' which effectively defined its domain of validity 
in universal terms. Keynes, however, rejected these assumptions, and in 
tum developed an understanding of an organic interrelation among the 
key variables of a 'complex' economic system. Carabelli concludes that 
Keynes's methodological views are central to his elaboration of an 
alternative economic theory. 
Another area of interest in Keynes's philosophical work is his early 
idealism - a concept which can, of course, be interpreted in a number of 
ways. Athol Fitzgibbons's essay is an attempt to argue that Keynes's 
early idealism is a form of Platonism inherited from Moore's work, and 
that this Platonism had an important role in the development of Keynes's 
early ~litist views. Moreover, because it can be argued Keynes remained 
an ~litist throughout his life, Fitzgibbons suggests that the influence of 
Keynes's early beliefs retained a place in Keynes's later thinking about 
economic life. 
The range of interpretations in these papers should provide a valuable 
introduction to the philosophical foundations of Keynes's economics. 
Keynes, like Adam Smith, Karl Marx and John Stuart Mill, was actually 
a philosopher--economist and must be understood as such. But it is not 
just an exegetical, scholarly gain to understand these foundations; coming 
to understand them also facilitates a better understanding of the types of 
influences which have been responsible for some of the greatest advances 
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in economics. Thus. in addition to providing a better understanding of the 
history of economic thought. these essays provide a basis for an intro-
duction to the type of know ledge that produces successful theories. 
